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What human values are carried by natural systems? I can answer that question directly 
while I indirectly address a deeper question. Are values in nature objective or subjective? 
Some values (the nutrition in a potato) seem objectively there, while others (the eagle as a 
national symbol) seem merely assigned. Either way, certain experiences that humans find 
to be valuable require and are carried by natural things. As we examine the types of 
natural values, we can wonder whether—at times at least—value intrinsic in nature 
enables humans to enjoy these values. 
Life Support Value 
All culture remains tethered to the biosystem, and the options within built environments, 
though they free us by shifting our dependencies around, provide no final release from 
nature. Humans depend on air flow, water cycles, sunshine, photosynthesis, nitrogen 
fixation, decomposition bacteria, fungi, the ozone layer, food chains, insect pollination, 
soils, earthworms, climates, oceans, and genetic materials. Some sort of inclusive envi-
ronmental fitness is required of even the most advanced culture. Humans live in a tech- 
nosphere but remain residents in a biosphere. 
Ecological values contribute positively to human experiences but also seem to be 
there apart from humans. In an evolutionary ecosystem, the central goods of the biosys- 
temic Earth were in place before humans arrived. Humans cash in on and spend what is 
naturally given. In many respects, though by no means all, the earthen setup is "a happy 
place." Those who find value to be entirely subjective will smile and say that humans are 
getting back their reflected emotions, as when others say that Earth is "a lonely place." 
But those who think more objectively will wonder why we find ourselves alive and well 
(that is, happy) in a life-support system that can evolve and sustain such life. 
   "Happy" is too subjective a word, but what if we say that Earth is a "fortunate" or 
"fertile" place—with significant fortunes where life has flourished? That begins to 
value what is going on independently of humans. What if we say that Earth is a "satisfac-
tory" place and mean not only that humans have prospered here but also that myriads of 
species have found "satisfactory" niches into which they are well fitted? Is not that 
objective satisfaction of life true with or without our human experiences of satisfaction? It 
seems parochial, uninformed ecologically, to say that our part alone in the drama 
establishes all its worth. Ecology is not something subjective that goes on in the human 
mind. Perhaps the value produced and carried in an ecosystem, together with the con-
scious valuing of it that comes later on, is not always a subjective affair either, although 
the latter does require human subjects.  In an ecological perspective, that Earth is valuable 
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would mean that the evolutionary ecosystem is able to produce value and has long been 
doing so. A late, remarkable product of the process is humans, who can claim to be of 
value in a unique way. When humans come, they find Earth often valuable, able to 
produce valued experiences. The subjective value events are a capstone subset super-
posed on the global, objective production and support, or carrying, of value. 
Forests and soil, sunshine and rain, rivers and sky, the agelong hills, the rolling 
prairies, the cycling seasons—if one insists on the word, these are resources, but also 
they are the sources, the perennial natural givens that support everything else. 
Economic Value 
Though humans require natural givens, they do not take the environment ready to hand. 
Rather they labor, rebuilding nature to their cultural needs, owing to the remarkably 
flexible powers of the hand and brain. Any living thing uses its environment as a re-
source. A squirrel hides a cache of acorns; a bird builds a nest. But these activities take 
place in ecologies, hardly yet economies. Economic value in the usual sense involves 
deliberately redoing spontaneous natural things, coupled with a commerce in such re-
made things. Animals do not exchange in markets; by contrast markets are basic to every 
culture. 
Human labor so dramatically adds value that we may be prone to devalue raw nature. 
"Crude" oil has no value in itself but is worth a price because a petroleum engineer may 
"refine" it. The sense of the re- in resource is that nature can be refitted by human labor, 
and the latter gives it utility. If so, we should not say, strictly speaking, that nature by 
itself has much or any economic value. It only carries the value of labor. 
   But human craft cannot produce any unnatural chemical substances or energies. All 
humans can do is shift natural things around, taking their properties as givens. In some 
sense, there is nothing unnatural about the properties of a computer or a rocket; as much as 
a warbling vireo or a wild strawberry both are assemblages of completely natural 
things operating under natural laws. This sets aside essential differences between artifacts 
and spontaneous nature to regain the insight that nature has economic value because it has an 
instrumental capacity—and this says something about the material on which the 
craftsmanship is expended. Nature has a rich utilitarian pliability, due both to the plu-
rality of natural sorts and to their multifaceted powers. This is nature's economic value in a 
basic, etymological sense of something we can arrange so as to make a home out of it. 
Such economic value is partly a function of the state of science, of supply and demand, 
but it is also a function of available natural properties, which often unpredictably mix 
with human ingenuity to carry value. When humans conserve nature, we hope in the 
genius of the mind, but we reveal our expectations regarding the as yet undiscovered 
wealth of natural properties that we may some day capture and convert into economic 
value. 
Recreational Value 
It may seem frivolous to move from labor to play, from life support to recreation, but the 
question is a quite serious one: why humans enjoy nature even when we no longer need it 
for economic or life supportive reasons. For some, nature is instrumental to an active 
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sound enough for pitons. Even so, it serves as a field for skill. For others, the natural 
qualities are crucial in contemplating an autonomous performance. They watch the fleecy 
cumulus building over the Great White Throne in Zion, listen for the bull elk to bugle, 
laud the aerial skills of the hummingbird at the bergamot. 
For the first group, nature is a place to show what they can do; for the other, values 
are reached as they are let in on nature's show—a difference surprisingly close to that 
between applied and pure science, to which we soon turn. These two sorts of recreational 
value—the gymnasium and the theater—can often be combined, as when a naturalist 
enjoys the exertion of a hike up a peak and also pauses at the Parry's primrose by the 
waterfall en route. 
Recreational values can be in sports and popular pastimes and thus humanistic, but 
they are not always so. People like to recreate in the great outdoors because they are 
surrounded by something greater than anything they find indoors. When persons enjoy 
watching wildlife and appreciating landscapes, though this may take considerable skills, 
the focus is on nature as a wonderland, full of eventful drama and a bizarre repertory, a 
rich evolutionary ecosystem where truth is stranger than fiction. 
Humans sometimes want the wild environment as an alternative to the built environ-
ment. The leisure in contrast to work for pay, the work (climbing, setting up camp) that 
isn't for pay, an environment with zest in contrast to a boring or familiar job, the spartan 
contrasts with the cited comforts—all these meet otherwise unmet needs. Here humans 
value the wilderness or the park noneconomically for its unbuilt characteristics. Is this 
only some sort of escape value? Or is there some more positive characteristic in wildness 
that recreates us? Are they getting away from it all? Or back to it all? 
On first analysis, recreation typically benefits humans because it recreates, rejuve-
nates them when they are worn from work. Preserved by humans, perhaps as a park, a 
wilderness, a wildlife refuge, the natural world preserves human life—by recreating it. 
Persons go outdoors for the repair of what happens indoors. At deeper analysis there is 
more. Recreating in natural systems, they touch base with something missing on baseball 
diamonds at city park. Sometimes what they seem to be valuing is creation more than 
recreation. 
Scientific Value 
Natural science is our latest and perhaps most sophisticated cultural achievement, but we 
should not forget that its focus is primitive nature. Although much recent science requires 
elaborate analytical equipment (electron microscopes and ultracentrifuges), the subject 
matter of all natural science lies first and fundamentally in natural systems—the Golgi 
apparatus in a cell or a feldspar crystal in Precambrian igneous rock. We certainly admire 
scientists with their theories and instrumented intelligence, but valuing science does not 
devalue nature; rather, we learn something about the absorbing complexity of the natural 
environment when it serves as the object of such noble studies. 
Natural science per se cannot be worthwhile unless its primary object, nature, is 
interesting enough to justify being known. To praise cognitive science is also to praise its 
object, for no study of a worthless thing can be intrinsically valuable. Filtering out all 
applied values, one reaches a residual scientific value in nature, an interest in both the 
natural stuff and the study of it, which has enlisted the greatest human genius. 
The steaming pools of Yellowstone preserve an optimal thermal habitat for primitive 
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an oxygen-free atmosphere. Endangered fishes in the American deserts present perhaps 
the most striking and rapid examples of the speciation process in North America. It is 
typically odd, useless, and often rare things that have high scientific value. By deci-
phering them science helps us tell the natural tale—how things are, how they came to be. 
That story cannot be worthless, not only because human roots lie in it, but because we 
find it a delightful intellectual pursuit. 
The benefits of pure science are not simply for scientists. They trickle down to all 
who appreciate the fauna, flora, landscapes more fully. No one sees the Grand Canyon 
aright unless helped by geologists. No one sees the Everglades without the benefit of 
geologists and botanists. Increasingly, humans valuing their natural systems want to be 
naturalists as well as consumers or recreators. They are birdwatchers, mineralogists, fern 
enthusiasts, butterfly collectors; they value a scientific appreciation of what they see 
because they want to value appropriately what is objectively there. 
Aesthetic Value 
Nature presents beauty in life and landscape—an eagle soaring, a snake slithering, the 
fiddleheads of ferns, purple mountains' majesties, the roar of cataracts. Yet justifying 
such aesthetic value verbally is as difficult as justifying the experience of pure science. 
The intrinsically valuable intellectual stimulation that the scientist defends is, in fact, a 
parallel to the aesthetic encounter that the aesthetician defends, for both demand a dis-
tance from everyday personal needs and yet a participatory experience nontransferable to 
the uninitiated. Sensitivities in both pure science and natural aesthetics help us see much 
farther than is required by our pragmatic necessities. In both, one gets purity of vision. 
   In culture, one appreciates human artistry—a painting, a statue. Art objects have 
their frames, their pedestals; plays are on stage, and fine furniture is placed with interior 
design. When humans value natural systems, the character of aesthetic experience is 
radically different. Experience is of wild nature, without artistic intent. Nothing is 
framed; we are not beholders of an orchestrated performance. The participant is in the 
midst of it all, surrounded by prairie or forest or standing on the rim of the canyon. 
People are challenged to do their own framing, to select what dimension of the scene to 
admire, how to respond to organic forms or geomorphic processes, to wind and water, 
smell and sound. 
Sooner or later, we know an authentic sense of awe. The sense of abyss overlooking 
a gorge is sublime, as is the eerie chill when, nearing a stormy summit, one's hair stands 
on end in the charged air. All these experiences are unlikely to be had sitting in a Chip-
pendale chair. We seldom get goose pimples before human artistry. 
A prosaic person will complain that the admirer of nature overlooks chestnuts aborted 
by the fungal blight, fractured snowflakes, imperfections everywhere. Every natural 
thing is marred by accidents and eventually destroyed by them. Does not the aesthetician 
repair nature before appreciating it? Sometimes. But in so doing, if we consider the case 
of organic beauty, this sees that ideal toward which a living thing is striving and which is 
rarely reached in nature. So the artist paints a perfect lady-slipper orchid. In the language  
of geneticists, the artist portrays that phenotype producable by the normal genotype in a 
congenial environment. Philistines will insist that all this is not true to be plain facts of 
nature; poets, using a distinction going back to Aristotle, will see that this is true to the 
poetry of a thing, though not true to its history, and yet the poetry (the genotypic norm) 
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Endangered Species Value 
When humans value natural systems, they want to preserve natural kinds. Congress has 
lamented, in the Endangered Species Act (87 Stat: 884 [1973]), the lack of "adequate 
concern (for) and conservation (of)" threatened and endangered species (Sec. 2). The 
Supreme Court said that in "language, history and structure" the Act "indicates beyond 
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of prior-
ities," and this seems to recognize some good or welfare of these species, an intent to 
protect them from danger, even if this also reflects and coincides with "esthetic, ecolog- 
ical, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its 
people" (TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978)). This suggests that endangered species 
ought to have their place on the American continent, mixed with the values of citizens. 
Two-thirds of Americans believe that eagles and mountain lions ought to be protected 
even at cost to humans (Kellert 1979). Many hold that endangered fauna and flora have 
something like a biotic right to exist—at least in representative areas—for what they are in 
themselves. 
The deepest good being preserved is the species of life itself, indeed the highest of 
priorities. Extinction shuts down the generative processes. What humans are doing, or 
allowing to happen through carelessness, is incrementally stopping the life evolved in 
natural systems. Every extinction is a kind of superkilling. It kills species beyond indi-
viduals, "essences" beyond "existences," the "soul" as well as the "body." It kills 
collectively, not just distributively. It kills the type, not just token individuals. To kill a 
species is to shut down a unique story, and we do not want to play the role of murderers. We 
have more understanding than ever of the speciating processes, more predictive power to 
foresee the intended and unintended results of our actions, and more power to reverse the 
undesirable consequences. When humans value natural systems, this generates duties to 
preserve, where possible, these species. 
Over evolutionary time, Earth has increased its kinds from zero to five to ten million 
species. Several billion years' worth of creative toil have been handed over to the care of 
this late-coming human species in which mind has flowered and morals have emerged. 
Even more lately in their explosive development, humans are awakening to new duties of 
preservation. When humans make once-common species rare, biological vitality is lost. 
When humans extinguish species, they stop the story. That makes humans misfits in the 
system, because they bring death without survivors into Earth's prolific exuberance of 
life. Life is a many-splendored thing; extinction dims its luster. Living forms ought rather to 
persist in their struggling beauty—flourishing, pushing on at the edge of perishing. 
Historical Value 
Wildlands provide the profoundest historical museum of all, a relic of processes that 
moved the world through 99.99 percent of past time. Humans are relics of that world, 
and that world, as a tangible relic in our midst, contributes to our sense of duration, 
antiquity, and identity. An immense stream of life has flowed over these lands humans so 
lately inhabit and still flows (however disruptedly so) around us. The river of life is a 
billion years long, and humans have traveled a million years on it, recording their pas- 
sage for several thousand years. Humans need living museums of natural history, a place 
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Without science we cannot know this history, as when the Yellowstone thermophiles 
or Archaeopteryx reveal something about the origins of life. But doing science is some-
thing else from doing history. Science is full of laws, theories, regularities, taxa, classifi-
cations, causal explanations. A historian wants more—a narrative that tells a story about 
what happened once upon a time, and, above all, the meanings in these events, if such 
there are. That is why science cannot teach us all we need to know about nature. Indeed 
interpretive natural history is quite a demanding inquiry. Here humans evaluate the story 
in which they stand and write the current chapter in the ongoing Earth narrative. 
Using nature to teach natural history is a sort of instrumental value, but here the living 
wildland museum and the historical reality are one and the same. When we treasure the 
living museum instrumentally, we may also come to recognize intrinsic value in the 
natural processes. 
Wildlands further provide historical value for the cultures superimposed on natural 
history. Americans (North, South, Canadian, Central) have a recent heritage of self-de-
velopment against a diverse and challenging environment, seen in pioneer, frontiersman, 
cowboy, and gaucho motifs. New World cultures remain close to the memory of a primi-
tive landscape. The American's ancestral virtues were forged with the European invasion 
of a (so-called) "empty" continent, which it was their "manifest destiny" to develop. 
Nor should we forget the "red" years, before the "white" years. Europeans as well have 
historical memories associated with nature—the British with the moors, the Germans 
with the Black Forest, the Russians with the steppes. Every culture remains resident in 
some environment. 
Forests, prairies, and ranges ought to be preserved as souvenir places for each genera-
tion of Americans learning (however secondarily or critically) their forefathers' moods, 
regained there quite as much as in the Minuteman Historical Park. Such places provide a 
lingering echo of what we once were, of a way we once passed. Without these memories 
we cannot know who and where we are. A person without a country is a tragedy indeed. 
Cultural Symbolization Value 
The bald eagle symbolizes American self-images and aspirations (freedom, strength, 
beauty), as does the bighorn ram, a "state animal" for Coloradoans. The pasqueflower is 
the state flower of South Dakota, the moose a symbol for Maine, the maple leaf for 
Canada. The lion is a British symbol; the Russians have chosen the bear. Natural areas 
enter local cultural moods—Grandfather Mountain in western North Carolina, Natural 
Bridge and the Shenandoah River in central Virginia. Every homescape has its old and 
familiar haunts—swimming holes, water gaps, passes—which enter our sense of be- 
longingness and identity. Culture commingles with landscape and wildlife in places 
named after geomorphic, faunal, or floral features: Tinkling Springs, Fox Hollow, 
Aspen, and Crested Butte. 
However much the native wildness is domesticated, humans want some wildness 
preserved, for it comes to express the values of the culture superimposed on it. What 
would be the impact on American hopes if the bald eagle became extinct? On New 
Hampshire with the loss of the Great Stone Face? What are the psychological connections 
between the Mississippi River and the state of Mississippi? Between the Scots and Loch 
Lomond? Would not the death of the last bighorn lower the perceived quality of life in 
Colorado? Would Boulder, Colorado, not be a poorer place with the Flatirons scarred 
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No culture develops in independence of the environment on which it is superimposed, 
no matter how relatively free humans are in their cultural options, no matter that the 
Chickahominies and the English did very different things in Virginia. In culture, there is 
but one Virginia, and each Virginian has a proper name. The human differences include 
conscious self-affirmations and heritages for which nature provides little precedent. But 
nature first is never twice the same, and the idiographic features in nature blend with 
those in culture to particularize and enrich the combined story. Always in the understory 
there are distinctive landscape features—the Shenandoah Valley or the Chesapeake 
Bay—with which the Virginians interact. The cultural symbolization capacity of nature 
is no accident but has been a repeated feature in the myriad cultures on Earth. 
Character-Building Value 
Wildlands are used by organizations that educate character—Boy and Girl Scouts, Out-
ward Bound, and church camps. Similar growth also occurs in individuals independently 
of formal organizations. The challenge of self-competence, in teamwork or alone, is 
valued, together with reflection over skills acquired and one's place in the world. Wild- 
lands provide a place to sweat, to push yourself more than usual, perhaps to let the 
adrenalin flow. They provide a place to take calculated risks, to learn the luck of the 
weather, to lose and find one's way, to reminisce over success and failure. They teach 
one to care about his or her physical condition. 
Wildlands provide a place to gain humility and a sense of proportion. The virtues of 
humility, simplicity, frugality, serenity, and independence can also be learned in town. 
But they are nowhere better taught than in encounter with nature. This recapitulates 
partly our historical experience; it anticipates the religious experience that we soon ex-
amine. What was earlier a recreational testing of what we can do is heightened into an 
achievement of self-identity. In a survey of three hundred geniuses, Edith Cobb found 
characteristic of their youth evocative experiences in natural locales, a formative factor in 
their creativity (Cobb 1959, 1977). Many people have reported how self-actualization 
was fostered in a wilderness setting. Nature is a place to "know thyself." 
Related to this is a therapeutic value in nature. Nature is a setting to treat psychologi-
cally disturbed persons. For some who are mentally ill, the ambiguity and complexity in 
culture can be disorienting. It is hard to discriminate among friends, enemies, and the 
indifferent, hard to get resolve focused on what to do next or to predict the consequences 
of delay. But in the wilds or on the farm, supper has to be cooked; one needs firewood 
and it is getting dark. There are probabilities in facing nature; maybe it won't rain when 
you forget your poncho. But there are no ambiguities. Exertion is demanded; visceral 
accomplishment is evident in a low-frustration environment. The self is starkly present, 
and the protocol is simpler. One really is on his own; or, one's friends are few, and she 
utterly depends on them. All this can mobilize the disturbed for recovery, using in basic 
form the same forces that create the character-building effect for us all. 
So far as humans have been selected over the evolutionary epic to need challenge, 
adventure, exertion, and risk, society must either provide avenues for such archetypal 
emotions or expect deviant behavior—gangs and rebels without a cause. There are alter-
native routes for such expression—sports, for instance, or, alas, the military. Humans 
are remarkably unspecialized. But perhaps wild and rural areas provide a "niche" that 
matches some deep-seated psychosomatic needs. The lack of this may be part of the 
trouble in our crowded, warring world. We do not know but can suspect that encounter 
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Diversity-Unity Values 
The sciences describe much natural diversity and also much unity, terms that are descrip-
tive and yet contain dimensions of value. The physical sciences have revealed the astro-
nomical extent of matter while reducing it into a few kinds of elements and particles, 
which dissolve into wave fields. The taxonomist has enlarged the array of natural kinds, 
while the biochemist has found only the materials of physics organized in basic chemis-
tries, such as the citric-acid cycle or DNA and RNA at the core of life. Evolution has 
traced every life form back to monophyletic or a few polyphyletic origins, while ecology 
has interwoven these myriad forms to connect them at present as fully as they have been 
related by paleontology. This macroscopic web is matched by the unity revealed by the 
electron microscope or the X-ray spectrometer. The natural pageant is a kind of sym-
phony of motifs, all spun from a few simple notes. 
The story of science is the discovery of a bigger universe with more things in it and 
the finding of laws and structures to explain their common composition and kinship. A 
few centuries ago we supposed this universe to have far less spatiotemporal and biolog-
ical diversity, and its unity was unknown or denied. Everywhere there was dualism and 
opposition—in heaven and earth, mind and matter, life and nonlife, humans and nature, 
gods and demons. No naturalist today would return to that universe, if he or she could, 
for it was oppressively small, less diverse, and yet also superstitious and lacking in the 
natural unity that we now know it to possess. 
Notice how both this diversity and unity feed the human mind. Mind cannot be 
formed under the homogeneity of a blank wall nor before the heterogeneity of a bewil-
dering jungle. A complex mind evolves in order to deal with a diverse world, yet one 
through which unifying relationships run. Do we then say that these features are of no 
value until thickened by the addition of human interest? Or do we wonder that just this 
system, evolving so, did thicken human interest to form the mind prehistorically and that 
it continues to do so now? The mind is a mirror of these properties in nature, and there is 
even a sense in which the mind, founded on the cerebral complexity and integrating 
capacity, is a product of nature's inclination both to diversify and to unify. 
Stability and Spontaneity Values 
A pair of complementary natural values mixes ordered stability with spontaneity, coun-
terparts that are descriptive and also valuational. That natural processes are regular—that 
gravity holds, oaks breed in kind, and succession is repeated—yields laws and trends 
rooted in the causal principle, and means that natural systems are dependable, as well as 
unified and intelligible. Every order is not a value; but a requisite of any universe is that it 
be ordered, and we need not despise a necessary good. Nor does such minimum essential 
order account for the ecological and biochemical constancy that supports life and mind, 
upon which all human knowledge, security, and values depend. 
The polar value, really a sort of freedom, is hardly known to science by any such 
name. Still, nature sometimes provides an "appearance" of contingency. Neither land-
scapes, nor aspen leaves, nor ecological successions are ever twice the same. What 
happens in field and forest is always something of an adventure, as the way the cottontail 
evades the coyote, or just when the last leaf is tossed from the maple and where the 
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of chance or of choice, believing that to say otherwise is to destroy the fundamental 
axiom of all science. But others require a less rigidly closed system, finding that science 
still prospers when positing statistical laws, which need not specify every particular. 
Each wild area is one of a kind, so we give it a proper name—the Rawah Mountains, 
the Dismal Swamp. Even when exploring some nameless canyon, one experiences a 
concrete locus never duplicated in idiosyncratic detail. We do not want order at the 
expense of spontaneous novelty, too much system and too little story. We want con-
stancy with contingency. The regularity is valuable, but so is this element of wildness. 
Just this wildness in natural systems, which might threaten to make nature chaotic, in fact 
adds novelty. By making each location different, wildness makes a favorable difference. 
It makes each ecosystem historic, the more excellent because no two are alike. 
We are not sure whether Australopithecus had to develop in Africa or whether gi-
raffes had to develop long necks, although both events may have been probable. For the 
conservatives, it is safest to say theoretically that here we only reveal our ignorance of 
nature's detailed determinism, that nature's surprises are only apparent, though perhaps 
we cannot now or ever escape this appearance. For the liberals, it is bolder and more 
satisfying, as well as true to practical experience, to say that natural systems allow the 
real appearance of spontaneous novelty. The Darwinian revolution revised the Newtonian 
view to find nature sometimes a jungle and not a clock, and many have disliked this. 
Contingencies do put a bit of chaos into the cosmos. But you can have a sort of adventure 
in Darwin's jungle that you cannot have in Newton's clock. This openness brings risk 
and often misfortune, but it sometimes adds excitement. Here nature's intelligibility, aes-
thetic beauty, dependability, and unity are enriched by the presence of spontaneity, and 
this can be valued too. 
Dialectical Value 
We humans are not really bounded by our skin, but life proceeds in environmental dia-
lectic. The hands have evolved for grasping natural things, but so has the brain, and 
sentient experience underruns mental life. The crafting of an arrow point, a rifle, or a 
rocket is an environmental exchange. Culture is carved out against nature, but carved out 
of nature, and this is not simple to handle valuationally. Superficially, we first say that 
the helps in nature are good, the hurts bad. So far as nature is antagonistic and discom-
forting, it has disvalue. With deeper insight, we do not always count environmental 
conductance as good and environmental resistance as bad, but the currents of life flow in 
their interplay. 
An environment that was entirely hostile would slay us; life could never have ap-
peared within it. An environment that was entirely irenic would stagnate us; human life 
could never have appeared there either. Our culture, in which our classical humanity 
consists, and our science, in which our modern humanity consists, has originated in the 
face of oppositional nature. Nature insists that we work, and this laboring and even 
suffering is its fundamental economic pressure. The pioneer, pilgrim, explorer, and 
settler loved the frontier for the challenge and discipline that put fiber into the American 
soul. One reason we lament the passing of wilderness is that we do not want entirely to 
tame this aboriginal element in which our genius was forged. 
But this is of a piece with the larger natural process of conflict and resolution. Half 
the beauty of life comes out of it—flowers, fruits, shells, scales, muscles, hair, locomo- 280  Holmes Rolston, III 
tion, perception, endurance. The cougar's fang sharpens the deer's sight, the deer's 
fleet-footedness shapes a more supple lioness. We admire this element of fight even in 
the maimed and blasted, even in the inanimate, gnarled timberline fir. The coming of 
Darwin is often thought to have ruined nature's harmonious architectures, but the 
struggles he posits, if sometimes overwhelming, are not always valueless. None of 
life's heroic quality is possible without this dialectical stress. Take away the friction, 
and would the structures stand? Would the system move? 
Do we then say that humans only wrest values instrumentally from intrinsically value-
less nature? Has this dialectical context of life and mind no systemic value? That humans 
should struggle against storm and winter is not here denied, nor that we may need to 
oppose wolves and thistles, rattlesnakes and malaria mosquitos. But we add that humans 
can value the alien in nature not only in its autonomous otherness, but even in its stim-
ulus, provocation, and opposition. We owe all culture to the mixed support and hostility 
of nature; the one is the warp, the other the woof in the weaving of what we have 
become. 
Life Value 
John Muir would not let Gifford Pinchot kill a tarantula at the Grand Canyon, remarking 
that "it had as much right there as we did" (Pinchot 1947, 103). A thoroughgoing hu-
manist may say that only personal life has intrinsic value, making every other life form 
instrumental to human interests, but a sensitive naturalist will suspect that this is a callous 
rationalization, anthropocentric class self-interest. The first lesson learned in evolution 
was perhaps one of conflict, but a subsequent one is of kinship, for the life we value in 
persons is advanced from but allied with the life in monkeys, perch, and wildflowers. 
A plant is a spontaneous life system, self-maintaining with a controlling program. It 
executes this project, checking against performance in the world, using feedback loops. It 
composes and recomposes itself, maintaining order against disordering tendencies. Plants 
do not have ends in view. They are not subjects of a life, and in that familiar sense, they 
do not have goals. Yet each plant develops and maintains a botanical identity, posting a 
boundary between itself and its environment. An acorn becomes an oak; the oak stands 
on its own. 
   This botanical program is coded in the DNA, informational core molecules, without 
which the plant would collapse into the humus. The genetic set is thus really a normative 
set; it distinguishes between what is and what ought to be. This does not mean that plants 
are moral agents. But the organism is an evaluative system, selecting resources for itself. 
The plant grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists death. All this, from one 
perspective, is just biochemistry—the whir and buzz of organic molecules, enzymes, 
proteins. But from an equally valid—and objective—perspective, the morphology and 
metabolism that the organism projects is a valued state. A life is spontaneously defended 
for what it is itself, without necessary further contributory reference, although in eco-
systems such lives necessarily do have further reference. The plants don't care, so why 
should I? But plants do care—using botanical standards, the only form of caring avail-
able to them. The plant life per se is defended—an intrinsic value. 
To put this in the language of conservation biology, a plant is already engaged in the 
biological conservation of its identity and kind, long before conservation biologists come 
on the scene. What humans who value nature ought to do is respect plants for what they 
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Religious Value 
Nature generates poetry, philosophy, and religion, and at its deepest educational capacity 
we are awed by staring into the stormy surf or peering down at the reversing protoplasmic 
stream in a creeping myxomycete plasmodium. Mountaintop experiences, sunsets, 
canyon strata, or a meadow of dogstooth violets can generate experiences of "a motion 
and spirit that impels . . . and rolls through all things (Wordsworth 1798). For wilderness 
purists intensely, and for most people occasionally, wildlands provide a cathedral setting. 
The wilderness elicits cosmic questions, differently from town. Humans are programmed 
to ask why, and the natural dialectic is the cradle of our spirituality. The wilderness works 
on a traveler's soul as much as it does his muscles. 
We might say, overworking the term, the nature is a religious "resource." Using a 
better word, we want a wilderness "sanctuary," a sacrosanct, holy place, where we draw 
near to ultimacy. Nature used as school for character is clearly an instrumental use, but 
what shall we say when nature is used as church? Is this too in instrumental use to 
generate human religious experiences, nothing more? Perhaps. But some of these experi-
ences will recognize God's creation, or the Ultimate Reality, or a Nature sacred in itself. 
In fact, one profanes such experience and nature alike to see nature as merely instru-
mental and otherwise devoid of value. 
Take the natural symbols—light and fire, water or rock, morning and evening, the 
warmth of summer and the cold of winter, the flowers of spring and the fruits of fall, rain 
and rivers, seeds and growth, earth and sky. How readily we put these material phe-
nomena to "metaphorical" or "spiritual" use, when we speak of life's "stormy 
weather," of strength of character "like a rock," or insecurity "like a shifting sand," of 
the "dark cloud with the silver lining." How profound are the psychological forces 
stirred within us the gray and misty sky, the balmy spring day, the quiet of a snowfall, 
the calling of loons. How the height of mountains "elevates" us, and the depths of the 
sea stimulates "deep" thoughts within! 
Bread, water, wine, paths, fatherhood, motherhood, mountains, rivers, light, and 
darkness—these are not incidentally among our richest sacramental elements. The strug-
gling life essence emerging overlaid on physical existence, the arrival of intelligence and 
whether it has any evolutionary point, the complementarity of spirit and matter—these 
remain puzzles never completely worked out; they point to something greater. We can 
count that a disvalue; nature outgoes and disappoints us. We can even count it a value 
that nature breeds a creative discontent and is so rich and demanding as to be at length 
inaccessible in the whole, knowable only in part. We are kept pilgrims and pioneers on a 
frontier, and to travel hopefully is better than to arrive. Meanwhile, this much at least we 
do value: that nature is endlessly stimulating to the mind, and bores only the ignorant or 
the insensitive. 
Human Owners and Natural Values 
Are values in nature subjective or objective? If humans are to talk about natural values, 
we must be actively "in on" them, that is, "share" those values in subjective, personal 
experiences adequate to judge them. Even scientists now realize that they always bear 
some relationship beyond that of passive observer to whatever they seek to know. But the 
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"turned on" than in making straightforward empirical judgments, but this can mean that 
we are rather more "tuned in" with what is so. It would be valuational solipsism to 
conclude that in those values natural things seem to carry we are getting back absolutely 
nothing but our projections. Values are met in real natural things, which seems to warrant 
the view that valuing is sometimes a form of knowing where humans register objective 
properties in the appreciating mind, notwithstanding what we may add in the appreciating 
process. Otherwise we commit the fallacy of misplaced location and ascribe to the viewer 
what is really in the scene, or at least what comes relationally. 
We might first think that the phrase "experienced value" is a tautology and the 
phrase "unexperienced value" a contradiction in terms, somewhat like the phrases "ex-
perienced thought" and "unexperienced thought." But the existence of unexperienced 
value is not a contradiction in terms, unless one builds into the meaning of value that it 
must be experienced. Humans must come to own any values about which they deliberate. 
We participate in them and realize that we are enjoying them. But it would be fatal to 
understanding the objective values carried by natural systems to conclude that since 
humans experientially own these values, values are found only in felt existence, nothing 
more. 
Value is not received as the conclusion of an argument, or by the indifferent observa-
tion of a causal series. A value or disvalue recognized as whatever has got some bite to it. 
That brings emoting, and we may be tempted to say that the marriage of a subject to its 
object gives birth to value. Value enters and exits with awareness. Doing science and 
taking holidays, for instance, are human experiences. So it might seem that any asso-
ciated value lies entirely in the human experiences, no matter how greatly features in 
nature contribute to it. On the other hand, life support and genetic information operate in 
the wild regardless of whether humans are present or aware of these things. Perhaps the 
human valuing of nature generates new levels of values, a kind that are experiential by 
logical necessity, but these seem superimposed on spontaneous natural values, some 
kinds of which are not experiential. 
If natural things have values, we cannot conceivably learn this without experiences by 
which we are let in on them. With every such sharing there comes a caring, and this may 
seem to proscribe objective neutrality. In fact, it only prescribes circumspect inquiry. All 
natural science is built on the experience of nature, but this does not entail that its de-
scriptions, its "facts," are just those experiences. All valuing of nature is built on experi-
ence too, but that does not entail that its descriptions, its "values," are just those experi-
ences. Value must be lived through, experienced, but so as to discern the character of the 
surroundings one is living through. 
A powerful emotion when leaving culture to return to nature is the sense of entrance 
into a natural place flourishing independently of any human presence. The forces by 
which natural systems run are not human forces; they are the biological and physical 
forces that have generated the world. Wild creatures are selected for their fitness in the 
places they inhabit; the wilderness is a complex tapestry of values, with each living thing 
defending itself, with vital needs, and the whole system a network in which goods are 
circulated round and integrated into other goods through both conflict and complemen-
tarity. 
Nature is a vast scene of birth and death, springtime and harvest, permanence and 
change, of budding, flowering, withering away, of pain and pleasure, of success and 
failure, of beauty giving way to ugliness and again to beauty. Contemplating it all, there 
come moments of truth valuing life's storied achievements, transient and sustained over 
chaos. There is a music to it all, and not least when in a minor key. The natural history Human Values and Natural Systems  283 
that envelops us is of value, not only because we humans place value there, but because value 
there is endorsed by the signature of time and eternity. 
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